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Abstract: Frege’s puzzle about identity sentences has long challenged 
many philosophers to find a solution to it but also led other 
philosophers to object that the evidential datum it is grounded on is 
false. The present work is an elaboration of this second kind of 
reaction: it explains why Frege’s puzzle seems to resist the traditional 
objection, giving voice to different and more elaborated presentations 
of the evidential datum, faithful to the spirit but not to the letter of 
Frege’s puzzle. The final outcome is negative, no satisfactory 
formulation of the evidential datum is found and Frege’s puzzle is 






Let us consider identity sentences including proper names and not 
other singular terms. As is well known, there are informative identity 
sentences and there are non-informative ones. And Frege’s puzzle 
about identity1 is a challenge to account for such a difference once the 
following allegedly evidential datum is acknowledged: 
 
a=a and a=b are obviously statements of differing cognitive value 
[Erkenntniswert]; a=a holds a priori and, according to Kant, is to be 
labelled analytic, while statements of the form a=b often contain very 
valuable extensions of our knowledge and cannot always be 
established a priori. (Frege 1892, 151) 
 
These observations are intended to establish a correlation between the 
information (or a valuable extension of knowledge) a competent 
speaker may draw from an identity claim and the names occurring in 
                                                
1 It may be useful to remember that there are two Frege puzzles: one concerning 
identity sentences, the other concerning propositional attitudes (see for example 
Zalta (2016) for distinguishing between the two puzzles). Frege’s puzzle about 
identity looks for an explanation of the information that may be had through some 
identity sentences, while Frege’s puzzle about propositional attitudes looks for an 
explanation of the different attitudes that may be had towards sentences whose parts 
have the same reference (as “Ateb is at least 5000 meters high” and “Aphla is at 
least 5000 meters high”, where “Ateb” and “Aphla” are names of the same 
mountain; the example is from Frege’s undated letter to Jourdain as referred to me 
by an anonymous referee – see Frege (1980, 80). I am concerned with the first 
puzzle in this work and not with the second. 
It has been argued by Salmon (1986, 12) that Frege’s puzzle about identity (i.e. 
the one which looks for an explanation of the information transmitted by an identity 
sentence) may be extended to other sentences not including the identity predicate. 
The challenge I am proposing to Frege’s puzzle about identity sentences may be 
extended to analogous puzzles about the other sentences Salmon considers. I will 
limit myself to identity sentences for the sake of simplicity. 
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it. In this regard, it may be useful to observe that the form of an 
identity sentence (i.e. the form a=a or the form a=b) is considered to 
be an intrinsic property of the sentence, uniquely dependent on 
whether the two name occurrences in it are instances of the same 
name or of different names. Moreover, it is claimed that the difference 
in cognitive value between the two types of identity statements 
depends on the fact that statements of the form a=a hold a priori and 
are analytic according to Kantian standards, i.e. they do not extend our 
knowledge, while statements of the form a=b often valuably extend 
it.2 Once it is acknowledged that an identity sentence cannot have any 
other form except the two above, I believe that a schematic 
formulation of the correlation between the information a competent 
speaker may draw from an identity sentence and the names occurring 
in it may be expressed in the following way: 
 
(ED) If an identity sentence is informative for a competent speaker, 
then the two name occurrences (in the identity claim) are 
instances of different names 
 
It may be useful to note that the converse of (ED) is not assumed by 
Frege (notice that he writes “statements of the form a=b often contain 
very valuable extensions of our knowledge” and not “statements of the 
                                                
2 Almog (1984, 6) gives a similar interpretation of the puzzle, he presents 
Frege’s puzzle as a riddle as follows: “How could identity sentences of the form 
“a=a” be uninformative, while identity sentences of the form “a=b” are 
informative?” While Almog (1984) proposes a solution to the puzzle so 
presented, I question the puzzle itself. 
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form a=b always contain very valuable extensions of our 
knowledge”), i.e. it is not presumed that if two name occurrences 
flanking an identity sign are instances of different names (or, in other 
words, if a sentence has the form a=b), then the identity sentence is 
informative. The converse of (ED) is, by the way, obviously false; in 
order to see this it is sufficient to realize that any occurrence of the 
sentence “Hesperus is identical to Phosphorus” (having the form a=b) 
is no longer informative for any professional philosopher of language. 
The point at issue is not that identity sentences of a certain form are 
informative for any speaker in any situation, the point is instead to 
find a necessary condition for any case in which a competent speaker 
experiences a valuable extension of her knowledge (Frege’s 
Erkenntniswert) through an identity sentence. According to the 
passage quoted above, the necessary condition for an identity sentence 
to be informative is to be found in the form of the sentence or, in other 
words, in the occurrence of two different names in the sentence.  
Frege’s target seems to be an account of the information gained 
through any identity sentence by any person and not of the 
information gained through a specific identity sentence by a particular 
hearer. Let us suppose that he is therefore interested in a general 
account of what it means for any identity sentence to be informative. 
In order to do this, Frege needs to find a necessary condition for any 
informative identity sentence. If Frege did not give a necessary 
condition for informative identity sentences, he would not be able to 
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account for the general phenomenon of informative identity 
sentences.3 
Once the alleged evidential datum (ED) is acknowledged, it is quite 
straightforward – or so I will argue – to derive that a distinctive 
property of coreferential names is a necessary condition for 
informative identity claims. If such a conclusion is to be accepted, it 
follows that if there is not such a distinctive property of coreferential 
names, there will not be informative identity claims. The puzzle 
makes a further step: it challenges us to individuate a distinctive 
property of coreferential names that accounts for the actual difference 
between informative and non informative identity claims, and as is 
well known, Frege responded to the challenge.4 
My concern is with the argument grounding the challenge, not with 
the response to it. I will claim that the argument is dependent on an 
alleged evidential datum, i.e. (ED), which is false. And, if (ED) is 
                                                
3 I am indebted to two anonymous referees for this journal for helping me to be 
explicit about the importance of necessary conditions for identity sentences in order 
for Frege to give an account of any informative identities. As one referee argued, it 
may be that the puzzle so interpreted rests on a mistake, it may be that not all 
informative identity sentences are informative for the same reasons and that there 
are not necessary conditions for all informative identity sentences. I do not consider 
this alternative account of informative identities, this task is left to other works.  
4 Frege changes his mind concerning the way to characterize the distinctive property 
of names accounting for the difference between informative and non-informative 
identity claims. Frege (1879) proposes a metalinguistic characterization of this 
property, while Frege (1892) argues for a semantic characterization of such a 
property: he maintains that names have a “sense”, i.e. what contains the mode of 
presentation of the thing designated. A critical reconstruction of Frege’s change of 
mind has been proposed, amongst others, in different and conflicting ways by 
Dummett (1973), Thau and Caplan (2001), May (2001), Heck (2003) and Dickie 
(2008). 
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false, it does not follow that a distinctive property of coreferential 
names is a necessary condition for informative identity claims.5  
The competent reader may object that the idea is not new: other 
philosophers have already argued that (ED) is false6 and that the 
existence of a distinctive property of coreferential names is not a 
necessary condition for true and informative identity claims. In my 
opinion, the objection to (ED) already present in the literature allows 
for a different formulation of an alleged evidential datum (I will call it 
(ED+)), which makes available a different formulation of Frege’s 
puzzle. According to this second formulation of the puzzle, it is the 
belief in a distinctive property of coreferential names that should be a 
                                                
5 (ED) is accepted by philosophers who have seriously considered Frege’s puzzle 
and offered an either Fregean or non-Fregean solution to the puzzle, as for example 
Salmon (1986), Fine (2007) and Recanati (2013). And it is also accepted by 
philosophers who have seriously considered Frege’s puzzle but questioned the 
solutions offered by other philosophers, as for example Wettstein (1986) who agrees 
that the information of an identity sentence is connected to its form, but argues that a 
solution to the puzzle should keep the cognitive content of an identity sentence and 
the linguistic meaning of the names in it quite distinct.  
6 The objection may be found, for example, in Salmon (1986), Kaplan (1990), 
Sainsbury (2005) and Almog (2008). It will be considered in §2. It may be useful to 
note that while Almog (2008) presents and criticizes three reasonable interpretations 
of Frege’s puzzle as it is presented by Frege himself, I consider possible 
reformulations of Frege’s puzzle which are not intended as adequate clarifications of 
what Frege wrote, but as possible revisions of Frege’s puzzle that are not true to the 
letter, but more to the spirit of the Fregean puzzle, these formulations are intended as 
different ways to establish a connection between the information gained by a person 
through an identity sentence and the beliefs she may have towards the actual or 
possible occurrences of names in it. Even if Almog’s hypotheses on possible 
interpretations of Frege’s puzzle are different from mine, the conclusion we reach is 
quite similar: we believe that the hypotheses we consider in order to reformulate 
Frege’s puzzle are inadequate and we both interpret our results as showing that the 
information we gain through identity sentences is not to be imputed to something we 
know or believe. 
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necessary condition for informative identity claims. And the challenge 
posed by the puzzle is to characterize this belief in order to account 
for the difference between informative and non-informative identity 
claims. 
Both arguments are grounded on an evidential datum: the standard 
Fregean argument is grounded on (ED), while the second formulation 
of the argument is grounded on (ED+). And I will argue that both 
(ED) and (ED+) may be evaluated only after the identity conditions 
for names have been established, i.e. after the conditions to be fulfilled 
in the following bi-conditional have been specified: two name 
occurrences are instances of the same name if and only if conditions 
… are satisfied.7 I will consider three different ways to characterize 
identity conditions for names and for each of them I will argue that 
both (ED) and (ED+) are false. It therefore follows that until a better 
characterization of the identity conditions for names has been stated, 
Frege’s puzzle is challenged.  
It may be useful to say from the beginning that challenging Frege’s 
puzzle – as I intend to do – is not equivalent to discrediting any 
account of the difference between informative and non-informative 
identity sentences. On the contrary, I believe that accounting for such 
a difference would be a very valuable advance in philosophical 
research. As will become clear in what follows, from my point of view 
                                                
7 Glezakos (2009) claims that Frege’s puzzle presupposes conditions for names to be 
identical, and not – as I do – conditions for name occurrences to be instances of the 
same name. As Glezakos recognizes, the two alternatives she proposes do not allow 
the puzzle to be posed. I argue instead that the puzzle may be posed, but it is 
grounded on a false premise.  
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challenging Frege’s puzzle is instead a way to question one of the 
assumptions that has been generally taken for granted by anyone who 
has proposed such an account, i.e. the assumption that there is a 
correlation between the information an identity sentence may bring 
and the names occurring in it (or, at least, the belief in the actual or 
possible names occurring in it). 
My work is organized in the following way. To begin with, I present 
the role of (ED) in arguing that informative identity sentences imply 
that there is a distinctive property of coreferential names (§1). As I 
have already pointed out, the assumption (ED) is not uncontroversial; 
therefore I consider an objection to it and I propose a revised version 
of the evidential datum, i.e. (ED+), and a different formulation of a 
Fregean puzzle grounded on (ED+) (§2). My aim is to argue that both 
(ED) and (ED+) are false if any of three different ways to specify the 
identity conditions for names are taken into account. In order to do 
this, I present two ways to specify the identity conditions for names 
(§3) and I claim that for each of them both (ED) and (ED+) are false 
(§4).  Then I consider a third way to specify the identity conditions for 
names and I argue that (ED) and (ED+) are false under this condition, 
too (§5). Before concluding, I consider a possible reformulation of the 
evidential datum, i.e. (ED++) and I argue that it is no better than (ED) 
or (ED+) (§6). I therefore conclude that the evidential datum is not to 
be assumed in any of its forms and that the Fregean puzzle is 




1.  First formulation of the alleged evidential datum  
As I said, Frege’s alleged evidential datum (i.e. (ED)) has an 
important role in arguing that true and informative identity sentences 
imply that there is a distinctive property of corefential names. The 
argument is grounded on the following observation: 
 
[1] At least one identity sentence is true and informative for a 
competent speaker  
 
Let us now consider [1] together with (ED) and two other 
assumptions (A1) and (A2): 
 
(ED) If an identity sentence is informative for a competent speaker, 
then the two name occurrences (in the identity claim) are 
instances of different names 
(A1)  If an identity claim is true, then the two name occurrences in it 
have the same referent 
 (A2) If two name occurrences have the same referent and are 
instances of different names, then there is at least one property 
differentiating coreferential names 
 
From [1], (ED), (A1) and (A2) it is easy to derive:8 
 
                                                
8 In order to follow the argument, it may be useful to suppose–simplifying a bit–that 
the premises have the following schematic forms: [1] A∧B, (ED) A→C, (A1) B→D, 
(A2) (C∧D)→E. And from these premises it is easy to derive the conclusion (C) E. 
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(C) There is at least one property differentiating coreferential names  
 
It may be useful to say something about (A1) and (A2). (A1) is 
explicit in Frege’s writing;9 (A2) is not explicitly stated but is quite 
evident in itself, the idea is simply that in order for coreferential name 
occurrences to be instances of different names, there should be at least 
one property which differentiates coreferential names.  
Now, once (ED), (A1) and (A2) are accepted, it is easy to derive 
that a distinctive property of coreferential names (i.e. (C)) is a 
necessary condition of a true and informative identity claim (i.e. [1]). 
And if there is not a property that distinguishes coreferential names 
(for example because there are no coreferential names), there will not 
be true and informative identity claims. The puzzle takes a further 
step: it challenges us to individuate a distinctive property of 
coreferential names which accounts for the difference between 
informative and non informative identity claims.10 
 
2. Second formulation of the alleged evidential datum  
(ED) is not uncontroversial. It has been objected that a competent 
speaker may be confused about name occurrences in identity 
                                                
9 See for example: “Now if we were to regard equality as a relation between that 
which the names ‘a’ and ‘b’ designate [bedeuten], it would seem that a=b could not 
differ from a=a, i.e. provided a=b is true.” (Frege 1892, 151) 
10 As I have already mentioned, Frege gave his own characterization of this 
distinctive property and also changed his mind on the way to characterize such a 
property. It may be interesting to note that this distinctive property of names should 
not be considered to be intrinsic, it may well be a relational property as, for example, 
Fine (2007) argued. 
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sentences. Consider for example the following observation by Mark 
Sainsbury: 
 
Kripke’s ‘Paderewski’ cases are like this: Peter first encounters the 
name ‘Paderewski’ in a musical context, and by all ordinary tests 
comes to understand it. Later he encounters it again in a political 
context, and does not realize that it is the same name of the same 
person again. For such a person, ‘Paderewski (the musician) is 
Paderewski (the politician)’ could come as news. (Sainsbury 2005, 
11, n. 6, my emphasis) 
 
and the following observation by David Kaplan: 
 
Paderewski cases [are cases] in which there is a single word that is 
being transmitted but the speaker makes the mistake of thinking it to 
be two words (Kaplan 1990, 110) 
 
Peter does not realize that the two name occurrences are instances of 
the same name in the identity sentence “Paderewski is Paderewski”; it 
may be supposed that Peter actually believes that the two occurrences 
of “Paderewski” are instances of different names and for this reason 
he gains some information through the identity sentence. We may 
therefore want to modify (ED) in the following way: 
 
(ED+) If an identity sentence is informative for a competent speaker, 
then that speaker believes that the two name occurrences (in the 
identity claim) are instances of different names 
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It is now interesting to see how (ED+) may raise a revised version 
of Frege’s puzzle. (ED+) may be considered in association with [1] 
and some assumptions (A3), (A4) and (A5): 
 
[1] At least one identity sentence is true and informative for a 
competent speaker 
(A3) If an identity sentence is informative for a competent speaker, 
then that speaker believes that the identity sentence is true11 
(A4) If a competent speaker believes that an identity sentence is true, 
then that speaker believes that the two name occurrences (in the 
identity claim) have the same referent 
(A5) If a competent speaker believes that two name occurrences have 
the same referent and are instances of different names, then that 
speaker believes that there is at least one property differentiating 
coreferential names12 
                                                
11 In order to explain this premise, it may be useful to consider the difference 
between information and disinformation. If a speaker believes that a sentence 
conveys information, that speaker considers the sentence true; if a speaker believes 
that a sentence conveys disinformation, that speaker considers the sentence false. 
12 It may be objected that (A5) is false: a competent speaker may satisfy the 
antecedent of the implication, without satisfying the consequent. The speaker under 
consideration may not have acknowledged that her beliefs described by the 
antecedent imply that there is a distinctive property of coreferential names. I believe 
that the supporter of the argument would contend that a reasonable speaker is not 
able to account for the fact that two coreferential name occurrences are instances of 
different names without assuming that there is a distinctive property of coreferential 
names which accounts for this difference; and if challenged with the request to give 
such an account, he would be led to recognize (and believe) that there is a distinctive 
property of coreferential names. A better formulation of (A5) may be the following: 
(A5*) if a competent speaker believes that two name occurrences have the same 
referent and are instances of different names, then that speaker is reasonably led to 
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From [1], (A3), (A4), (A5) and (ED+), it is easy to derive:13 
 
(C+) A competent speaker believes that there is at least one property 
differentiating coreferential names14 
 
(C+) is obviously different from (C). The difference between (C) 
and (C+) is that in the first case it is argued that a distinctive property 
of coreferential names is instantiated, while in the second case it is 
argued that it is only believed to be instantiated. In this second case, 
the argument is intended to show that the belief in a distinctive 
property of coreferential names (i.e. (C+)) is a necessary condition for 
a true and informative identity sentence (i.e. [1]). And if such a belief 
is not instantiated, there will not be informative identity claims. As in 
                                                                                                                                                            
believe that there is at least one property that differentiates coreferential names. The 
conclusion of the argument considered here would then be: a competent speaker is 
reasonably led to believe that there is at least one property that differentiates 
coreferential names. I adopt (A5) for simplicity. 
13 In order to follow the argument, it may be useful to suppose–simplifying a bit–that 
the premises have the following schematic forms: [1] A∧B, (ED+) A→C, (A3) 
A→D, (A4) D→E, (A5) (C∧E)→F. From these premises it is easy to derive the 
conclusion (C+) F. 
14 It may be useful to emphasize that a de dicto reading of conclusion (C+) is 
assumed. Supposing that S is an arbitrary competent speaker and x is a variable 
ranging over properties, (C+) should be read: S believes ∃x[x differentiates 
coreferential names]. The de re reading of (C+) is not assumed, i.e.: ∃x[S believes 
that x differentiates coreferential names]. Therefore the necessary condition for an 
informative identity sentence is not argued to be a property (as in the first version of 
the puzzle) but a belief. And if the challenge posed by the first version of the puzzle 
was to characterize a property that is a necessary condition for informative identity 
sentences, the challenge posed by the second version of the puzzle is to characterize 
a belief that is a necessary condition for informative identity sentences.   
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the first formulation of Frege’s puzzle, the second formulation takes a 
further step after pointing out a necessary condition for the 
information given by any identity sentence: it requires characterizing 
the belief in a distinctive property of coreferential names which 
accounts for the difference between informative and non-informative 
identity claims. 
This second version of the puzzle may be easier to understand if we 
imagine that its proposer has in mind Peter who finds the identity 
sentence “Paderewski is identical to Paderewski” informative. It may 
be argued that in such a case Peter believes that two names are 
occurring in the identity sentence and that there is (at least) one 
property differentiating such coreferential names. This second version 
of the puzzle is grounded on the assumption that Peter’s belief is 
shared by anyone who finds an identity sentence informative. And the 
challenge raised by the puzzle is therefore to characterize the belief in 
a property differentiating coreferential names so as to account for the 
difference between informative and non-informative identity claims. 
Let me sum up what I have been arguing in this section. I 
considered an objection that has been raised against the alleged 
evidential datum of Frege’s puzzle (i.e. (ED)). And I argued that the 
objection, if correct, allows for a different formulation of the 
evidential datum (i.e. (ED+)) and a different formulation of the 
Fregean puzzle.  
I personally believe that the objection raised against (ED) is 
misleading: it leads us to believe that (ED+) is better than (ED). I will 
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argue instead that both (ED) and (ED+) may be questioned on the 
same grounds.  
 
3. What is a name? 
The two Fregean puzzles considered rest on an assumption that may 
be expressed as (ED) or (ED+), i.e. that if an identity sentence is 
informative for a competent speaker, then the two name occurrences 
in it are instances (or at least they are believed by the competent 
speaker to be instances) of different names. This assumption 
presupposes what it is for name occurrences to be instances of 
different names. As a matter of fact, what it is for name occurrences to 
be instances of different names is controversial because there is no 
univocal notion of name. As David Kaplan (1990) argued, it is useful 
to distinguish between generic names and common currency names.  
In order to consider the distinction, let us consider the following 
question:  
 
Are the name occurrences of “David Cameron” that refer to the 
present Prime Minister of the United Kingdom instances of the same 
name as the occurrences referring to other people? 
 
Two opposite answers may be given to this question. Let us 
consider them in turn. 
 
First answer: Yes, they are instances of the same name. It is 
common sense to say that these people share a name. And when we 
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say that they share a name we say that they share the same generic 
name, to use an expression introduced by Kaplan (1990). 
 
Second answer: No, they are instances of different names. There is 
at least one sense in which the occurrences of “David Cameron” that 
refer to the British Prime Minister are instances of a different name to 
the ones referring to other people. Using an expression adopted by 
Kaplan, different usages are instances of different common-currency 
names. 
 
As Kaplan (1990) has observed, it is important to resist the 
temptation to characterize names (be they generic names or common-
currency names) in terms of a single abstract form, as the forms of 
names evolve in time through rules discovered by linguists. 
Let us define a generic name as follows: 
 
(GN) Name occurrences are instances of the same generic name iff 
they exemplify abstract forms which are evolutionarily 
correlated as explained by linguists  
 
Things are different for common-currency names whose 
occurrences cannot be characterized only in terms of evolutionarily 
correlated abstract forms, a role is played also by the referent they 
happen to have. In my opinion, the best way to define the relation 
between a common-currency name and its occurrences is to combine 
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the characterization of generic name with a Kripkian intuition (Kripke 
1980).15 My proposal is the following: 
 
(CCN) name occurrences are instances of the same common-currency 
name iff they are instances of a single generic name and are 
connected by a causal chain that starts with the introduction of a 
referent for them16 
 
It is now time to consider the alleged evidential datum at the basis 
of the two formulations of the Fregean puzzle in the light of these 
characterizations of name.  
                                                
15 See also Devitt (1981) and Richard (1990). 
16 Kaplan (2011) manifests scepticism about the “causal chain” idea and, replying to 
Hawthorne and Lepore (2011), explains why he changed his mind on it. He writes: 
“In “Words”, I abandoned the view that the continuous path I insisted upon for word 
identity requires causality. This was because the continuity involves mental 
activities that I am methodologically reluctant to characterize as causally 
determined. […] The important thing is that there be a link, not that it is causally 
determined.” (Kaplan 2011, pp. 513-514, emphasis in the original). I adopt the 
Kripkean characterization of common currency names; for a more Kaplanian 
definition substitute “causal chain” with “link”. In any case, the difference between 
the two definitions is not relevant to my argument. 
It is moreover important to note that Kaplan (1990) leaves open the possibility 
that a common-currency name may change its referent. In order to give a correct 
characterization of common-currency names this possibility should be taken into 
account. My characterization is intended to be neutral with respect to this possibility. 
Another possibility to be left open is that some common-currency names do not 
have referents. My characterization is intended to be neutral also with respect to this 
possibility. A better formulation than (CNN) in order to account for this last 
possibility is the following: (CNN*) name occurrences are instances of the same 
common-currency name iff they are instances of a single generic name and are 
connected by a causal chain starting either with the introduction of a referent for 




4. Common-currency names and the evidential datum 
It is quite evident to the smart reader that the notion of generic name 
cannot be in play when considering (ED) and (ED+).17 Let us now 
consider the hypothesis that the notion of common-currency name is 
in play when the evidential datum is under consideration. (ED) and 
(ED+) become as follows 
 
(ED*) If an identity sentence is informative for a competent speaker, 
then the two name occurrences are instances of different 
common-currency names  
 
(ED+*) If an identity sentence is informative for a competent speaker, 
then that speaker believes that the two name occurrences are 
instances of different common-currency names 
 
In order to see that (ED*) and (ED+*) are false, let us consider the 
following hypothesis concerning the origin of “Istanbul” in Greek. 
According to this, “Istanbul” is derived from a corruption of 
“Constantinople”, the idea being that the parts between square 
parentheses were lost in “[Con]stan[tino]ple” and an “I” was prefixed 
to the name (in the same way as “Smyrna” became “Izmir”), so that 
“Constantinople” became “Istanbul”. Now if this hypothesis is correct, 
at least in Greek, occurrences of “Constantinople” and occurrences of 
                                                
17 I am indebted to an anonymous referee for trusting in the smart reader. 
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“Istanbul” are instances of the same generic name and of the same 
common-currency name.  
There is another more accredited hypothesis concerning the origin 
of “Istanbul”,18 but let us suppose that the one presented above is the 
correct one. Let us now consider a competent speaker who actually 
gains some information through the identity sentence “Constantinople 
is identical to Istanbul”; suppose for example that she did not know 
where Constantinople was, even if she was informed about the exact 
location of Istanbul. The identity sentence is informative for this 
speaker, even though she does not have a belief as to whether the two 
name occurrences are instances of the same common-currency name 
or not, and she does not have a belief about it even after she has 
gained some information through the identity sentence. Suppose for 
example that the speaker recognizes she has gained some information 
through the identity sentence “Constantinople is identical to Istanbul” 
and, after an adequate explanation of what makes two occurrences be 
instances of the same common-currency name, we ask: “Are the two 
name occurrences in the identity sentence instances of the same 
common-currency name or not?”, the speaker may honestly answer: “I 
have no idea”, as she may be uncertain about the etymological origin 
of the two occurrences and therefore she may prefer to be cautious. 
So, (ED*) and (ED+*) are false: the speaker under consideration finds 
the identity sentence informative, even though it is false that the two 
                                                
18 The more accredited hypothesis concerning the origin of the name “Istanbul” is 
that it is a corruption of the Greek “eis tèn pólin” [to the city or in the city].  
According to this hypothesis, it was a common Greek usage to call Constantinople 
simply “The City”.  
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name occurrences are instances of different common-currency names 
and it is obviously false that the speaker believes that the two 
occurrences are instances of different common-currency names: she 
actually does not believe that they are instances of different common-
currency names both before having gained the information through the 
identity sentence and afterwards.  
 
5. Private names and the evidential datum 
It may be objected that the notions of name I have considered are 
public, they have to do with the social character of names. Since an 
identity sentence may be informative for one speaker and not for 
another, it may be the case that what is relevant in order to evaluate 
the information drawn from an identity sentence does not have to do 
with social characteristics of names, but with private ones, i.e. with 
what any individual speaker believes to be names. 
Let us call “a private name” a set of name occurrences established 
by the beliefs any individual speaker has about public names. A 
private name is not an idiosyncratic name (i.e. a name whose 
phonological and semantic characteristics are entirely decided by a 
single speaker), it is not even a public name (i.e. a name whose 
identity condition and semantic condition are established 
independently of what a single speaker believes), it is a set of name 
occurrences established by the beliefs of a single speaker about what 
she considers a public name, where such beliefs may not be 
completely adequate according to the experts’ standards. The idea is 
simply that speakers have the ability to classify name occurrences; 
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ideally they collect name occurrences into classes. It may be that this 
ability is partly sub-personal, and in most cases the speaker is just 
aware that a name occurrence is believed by her to belong to the same 
class as others (or another) she has previously come across or that a 
name is new to her. Given such a rough characterization, it is possible 
to give the following identity conditions for name occurrences of a 
private name: 
 
(PN) Name occurrences are instances of the same private name of a 
competent speaker iff they are collected by such a speaker into 
the same class 
 
Let us now consider again (ED) and (ED+). First of all, it is useful 
to realize that, under this characterization of the identity conditions for 
names, (ED) and (ED+) become indistinguishable as long as two 
name occurrences are instances of different private names of a 
competent speaker if and only if this competent speaker believes that 
the two name occurrences are instances of different private names of 
hers. Let us consider now (ED) which becomes: 
 
(ED**) If an identity sentence is informative for a competent speaker, 
then the two name occurrences are instances of different private 
names of hers 
 
In order to see that (ED**) is false, we should consider a case in 
which the classification of a name occurrence by a competent speaker 
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is for some reason indeterminate and it is therefore indeterminate what 
she believes. Suppose for example that a native English person with 
little knowledge in the field of Chinese culture finds in a book the 
following consideration: “Mao Zedong commanded the Long March 
during the Second Sino-Japanese War” and in another book the 
following consideration: “Mao Tse-tung was a leader”. It is perfectly 
reasonable that such a person may ask: “Is Mao Zedong identical to 
Mao Tse-tung?” And after she has enlarged her cognitive content 
through the affirmative statement “Mao Zedong is identical to Mao 
Tse-tung”, she may be still uncertain on how to classify the two name 
occurrences and she may therefore ask: “Are the two name 
occurrences transliterations of the same Chinese characters or are they 
transliterations of different Chinese characters?”19 The situation 
envisaged is intended to show that (ED**) is false: the person under 
consideration finds the identity sentence “Mao Zedong is identical to 
Mao Tse-tung” informative even though the two name occurrences are 
not instances of two private names of hers, because after acquiring 
information through the identity sentence she may still be wondering 
                                                
19 It may be suspected that an affirmative answer to this question makes it possible 
to know not only that the two name occurrences are instances of the same private 
name, but also that they are instances of the same common-currency name. As a 
matter of fact this is not so: it may still be possible that different causal chains were 
introduced with the same Chinese characters and with the same referent as is argued 
by Kaplan (1990, 114-115) when considering the case of the Mischievous 
Babylonian. For this reason, the competent speaker may be content to classify the 
two occurrences as being instances of the same private name of hers, even though 
the two occurrences are not instances of the same common-currency name and the 
speaker does not believe that they do. 
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whether to classify the two occurrences as being instances of the same 
private name or not. 
 
6. An alleged third formulation of the evidential datum 
Let me try to sum up what I have been doing. I have argued that the 
alleged evidential datum (either (ED) or (ED+)) which grounds two 
formulations of a Fregean puzzle is false if we assume any of the three 
identity conditions for names previously considered.  
I have had to acknowledge that the general reaction to my argument 
is to complain that I did not try hard enough to formulate an evidential 
datum for a Fregean puzzle. For example, I have been criticized20 for 
not considering the following modification of (ED+): 
 
(ED++) If an identity sentence is informative for a competent speaker, 
then that speaker believes that the two name occurrences (in the 
identity claim) might be instances of different names. 
 
(ED++) is not a neutral formulation of the evidential datum as it 
allows two different interpretations of the word “might”: an epistemic 
reading and a metaphysical one. My target in this section is to argue 
that (ED++) is not true under both interpretations and therefore it does 
not ground a Fregean puzzle.21 
                                                
20 By an anonymous referee. I am grateful for the critical comment that helped me to 
be more explicit about what I am doing. 
21 In order to formulate a Fregean puzzle, (ED++) should be taken for granted 
together with other assumptions which may be interpreted in different ways as long 
as there are both epistemic and metaphysical interpretations of the words “might” 
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Let us start with an epistemic reading of the word “might” in 
(ED++). As a matter of fact, there is a lively debate about the correct 
interpretation to give to epistemic modal operators. In particular a 
sentence like “S believes that x might be P” is interpreted by a 
supporter of domain semantics (like Yalcin 2007, 996) as “It is 
compatible with S’s beliefs that x is P” and by a supporter of 
relational semantics (see Yalcin 2007, 997) as “S believes that it is 
compatible with her own beliefs that x is P”. Therefore, it follows that 
under an epistemic reading of “might”, (ED++) has one of the 
following two interpretations:  
 
                                                                                                                                                            
and “necessarily”. The best way I can think of to formulate a Fregean puzzle with 
(ED++) is to assume the following premises: 
[1] At least one identity claim is true and informative for a competent speaker 
(A3) If an identity sentence is informative for a competent speaker, then that speaker 
believes that the identity sentence is true  
(A6) If a competent speaker believes that an identity sentence is true, then that 
speaker believes that the two name occurrences (in the identity claim) 
necessarily have the same referent 
(A7) If a competent speaker believes that two name occurrences necessarily have 
the same referent and might be instances of different names, then that speaker 
believes that there might be at least one property which differentiates 
coreferential names  
From [1], (A3), (A6), (A7) and (ED++), it is easy to deduce: 
(C++) A competent speaker believes that there might be at least one property which 
differentiates coreferential names 
In order to follow the argument, it may be useful to suppose–simplifying a bit–that 
the premises have the following schematic forms: [1] A∧B, (ED++) A→C, (A3) 
A→D, (A6) D→E, (A7) (C∧E)→F. From these premises it is easy to derive the 
conclusion (C++) F.  
(C++) is obviously different from (C+) and (C), but it is still a challenge if we 
have any reason to assume the premises which led to it in any of their 
interpretations. 
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(ED++*) If an identity sentence is informative for a competent 
speaker, then it is compatible with that speaker’s beliefs that the 
two name occurrences (in the identity sentence) are instances of 
different names. 
 
(ED++**) If an identity sentence is informative for a competent 
speaker, then that speaker believes that it is compatible with her 
own beliefs that the two name occurrences (in the identity 
sentence) are instances of different names. 
 
In order to realize that these two interpretations are not true, 
consider the following case under the assumption that it is equally 
adequate for each of the three notions of name previously considered. 
Imagine that Sally (a non philosopher) is trying to establish whether 
Descartes is Cartesius. Before solving her doubt, we ask her: “Is it 
compatible with your beliefs that the two name occurrences 
“Descartes” and “Cartesius” are instances of different names?” 
Supposing that Sally is smart enough to understand our question, she 
may reasonably answer: “I believe that “Descartes” and “Cartesius” 
are connected somehow, but I do not know how”. This means that 
Sally has uncertain beliefs. It may be useful to distinguish the cases in 
which we do not have beliefs (let us say, we have no idea about 
something) from the cases in which we are uncertain. When someone 
does not have beliefs concerning whether “Cartesius” and “Descartes” 
are somehow related, it is compatible with her beliefs both that they 
are name occurrences of the same name and that they are name 
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occurrences of different names. The case is different when someone is 
uncertain. This is the case of Sally: she believes that “Cartesius” and 
“Descartes” are name occurrences connected in some way, but she is 
uncertain how they are connected; for this reason there is no fact of 
the matter about whether it is compatible with Sally’s beliefs that 
“Cartesius” and “Descartes” are instances of different names. And 
Sally may maintain uncertain beliefs about the two name occurrences 
even after she holds the information that Cartesius is Descartes. 
 The case of Sally is a counterexample to (ED++*) and (ED++**); 
in particular, it shows that (ED++*) and (ED++**) are not true 
(leaving it open whether they are indeterminate or false). Sally gains 
information when we say to her that Cartesius is Descartes, but it is 
not true that it is compatible with her beliefs that “Cartesius” and 
“Descartes” are instances of different names, because there is no fact 
of the matter on this regard. Moreover as long as Sally is smart 
enough to be aware that there is no fact of the matter on whether her 
beliefs are compatible with the two name occurrences being instances 
of different names, it is not true that she believes that her beliefs are so 
compatible. To sum up, when we consider the case of Sally, the 
antecedent of the conditionals (ED++*) and (ED++**) is true, while 
the consequent is not, therefore the conditionals are not true. 
As I have already mentioned, there is another interpretation of 
(ED++) depending on a metaphysical interpretation of the word 
“might”, i.e. the interpretation we give to this word when we say that 
many people believe that things might be better than they are. In this 
case, we do not intend that it is compatible with what people believe 
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that things are better than they are (nor do we intend that people 
believe that it is compatible with what they themselves believe that 
things are better than they are), but we mean that people have beliefs 
about how things might be metaphysically (i.e., they believe that it is 
metaphysically possible for things to be better than they actually are). 
We may suspect that beliefs concerning name occurrences’ 
metaphysical possibilities are necessary conditions for the information 
to be gained from (at least) identity sentences. This is a highly 
speculative hypothesis and I believe that it is not correct. In order to 
argue for the claim that it is an incorrect hypothesis, it may be useful 
to restate (ED++) with a clear metaphysical interpretation of the word 
“might”, i.e. 
 
(ED++***) If an identity sentence is informative for a competent 
speaker, then that speaker believes that it is metaphysically 
possible that the two name occurrences (in the identity sentence) 
are instances of different names. 
 
Let us now consider a person who believes that there is only one 
possible world (or one single possibility): the actual one.22 This 
Spinozist belief does not prevent such a person from finding identity 
sentences informative. As a matter of fact, when considering such a 
person (ED++***) has the same truth conditions as (ED+): 
 
                                                
22 I am indebted to Alfredo Tomasetta for suggesting to me this Spinozist belief as a 
useful device for objecting to (ED++***). 
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(ED+) If an identity sentence is informative for a competent speaker, 
then that speaker believes that the two name occurrences are 
instances of different names 
 
For any statement P, the competent speaker with a Spinozist 
interpretation of modality believes that it is metaphysically possible 
that P if and only if she believes that P. It is therefore evident that 
(ED+) and (ED++***) are truth-conditionally equivalent when 
considering such a person.  
In the previous sections, I have presented counterexamples to (ED+) 
making different assumptions concerning the notion of name relevant 
for it. These same counterexamples may be reconsidered assuming 
that the competent speaker considered in each of them accepts a 
Spinozist interpretation of modality: they also become 
counterexamples to (ED++***). I therefore conclude this section 
claiming that (ED++) is not a better formulation of the Fregean 
evidential datum than (ED) or (ED+). 
 
7. Some concluding remarks 
I have argued that the alleged evidential datum expressed as (ED), 
(ED+) or (ED++) is not true if any of the three ways to characterize 
the identity conditions for names are taken into account. And, if the 
evidential datum is not true, the Fregean puzzle grounded on it is 
challenged.  
It may be relevant to be explicit about what I am claiming and what 
I am not. I am not claiming that it is impossible to give a necessary 
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condition for a true identity sentence to be informative for a 
competent speaker. For the reader interested in such a necessary 
condition, I suggest the following one:  
 
[NC] if an identity sentence is informative for a competent speaker, 
then that speaker does not believe that the two names 
occurrences in it are instances of the same common-currency 
name or of the same private name23 
 
From my point of view, it is crucial that [NC] is of no use for 
generating the puzzle. In order to realize this, it is important to note 
that the necessary condition specified in [NC] for informative 
identities is expressed as an absence of belief (it says that the 
competent speaker does not believe that …). Supposing that S does 
not believe P, this does not imply that S believes non-P, nor that S has 
good reasons not to believe P; S may be uncertain about P, not having 
an epistemic attitude either towards P or towards non-P. Therefore the 
necessary condition for informative identities specified in [NC] is 
compatible with an absence of a specific belief-attitude. And the 
absence of particular belief-attitudes by competent speakers is exactly 
the kind of situation I considered in many of my counterexamples to 
(ED), (ED+) and (ED++). Now, it is important to note that the absence 
of particular belief-attitudes by competent speakers cannot in itself be 
sufficient to grant any other positive belief-attitude and for this reason 
                                                
23 I am indebted to Andrea Bianchi for a version of the necessary conditions for 
informative identities similar to [NC].  
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the necessary condition for informative identities specified in [NC] 
cannot be used for justifying any positive belief-attitude towards a 
(possible or actual) distinctive property of coreferential names.24 
My claim in this work is that there is no necessary condition for true 
identity sentences to be informative that is relevant for a Fregean 
puzzle. A Fregean puzzle, in my opinion, is generated by an argument 
for the thesis that a distinctive property of coreferential names or the 
belief in such a property or the belief in such a possible property is a 
necessary condition for true and informative identity sentences. The 
puzzle is then a challenge to individuate a distinctive property of 
coreferential names or to characterize a belief in a distinctive (or in a 
possible distinctive) property of coreferential names accounting for 
the difference between informative and non-informative identity 
claims. As long as I find no reason to assume that this distinctive 
property or the belief in this (possible or actual) distinctive property is 
a necessary condition for informative identity claims, I find no reason 
to accept the challenge posed by Frege’s puzzle.*
                                                
24 It is useful to note that it may be argued that [NC] is not true. Suppose the objector 
claims that when a subject S is uncertain about P, it is indeterminate that S believes 
P and that S does not believe P. Therefore, according to the objector, if the speaker 
is uncertain whether two name occurrences belong to the same common-currency 
(or private) name and gains information through the identity sentence constituted by 
them, the antecedent of [NC] is true, while the consequent is indeterminate and [NC] 
is presumably indeterminate as well. It is not my intention to defend the truth of 
[NC]. I am merely considering the philosopher who maintains that when S is 
uncertain about P, S does not believe P. For such a philosopher [NC] is true, but 
[NC] is not of any help in order to defend the Fregean puzzle. 
* I am particularly grateful to Alfredo Tomasetta who read different versions of the 
paper, made useful suggestions and helped me to define my target. I presented a 
version of this paper during ECAP7 in Milan and I would like to thank Damiano 
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Costa, Pierdaniele Giaretta, Diego Marconi and Marina Sbisà for their helpful 
remarks on this occasion. I am indebted to Luca Barlassina and Sandro Zucchi for 
reading a previous version of this work and discussing it thoroughly with me; 
Clotilde Calabi kindly participated in the discussion. I thank Ernesto Napoli for 
careful readings and useful comments. I presented a version of this work in Parma, 
where I greatly benefited from the observations of Andrea Bianchi and Marco 
Santambrogio, and I enjoyed the discussion there.  
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